We examine the history of the organization of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and assess whether Republican terrorism reflected the possession of valuable group-specific human capital within the terrorist cell. The analysis is motivated by economic models of the formation of specialized groups. We also note the public-goods coordination problem facing terrorist groups, given their inability to use mainstream enforcement mechanisms.
Introduction
We build an historical analysis of organizational splits within the Irish Republican Army (IRA) on the tradition of recent papers identifying both rationality and organizational constraints as important elements explaining terrorist activities (Pittel and Rűbbelke, 2011; Shughart, 2011; Santiford-Jordan and Sandler, 2014; Phillips and Pohl, 2014) . We argue that the terrorist cell is a type of dysfunctional group, or gang, using violent acts to force transfers of political resources, and that it can be understood largely in terms of the benefits of marshalling the human capital embodied in it (Dnes and Garoupa, 2010; Allen and Reed, 2006) and of coordinating loyal behavior (Leeson, 2009; Skarbek, 2012 and 2014) . Terrorists are rational in two senses. First, they face a budget constraint so they are confronted by the issue of making best use of resources; second, rational responses to counterterrorist policies will aid groups in securing their political goals (Shughart, 2011) .
Our view of rationality is similar to that of Tullock (1974) and regards human behavior as purposeful and consistent over time. This view of rationality does not rule out terrorists having both intrinsic and extrinsic motives, where the former can reflect the representation of a segment of the population such as republicans resident in Northern Ireland or elsewhere (Frey, 1997; Benabou and Tirole, 2003) . Intrinsic motivation is a simpler way to recognize extra-personal motives, or moral sentiments (Smith, 1976) , than introducing pure altruism into our analysis, which would raise major difficulties for our view of rationality (Collard, 1978) .
As Schelling suggested and more recent research supports, organizational issuessuch as fund raising and the need for leaders to manage a group well -arise naturally in the setting of terrorist groups (Schelling, 1991; Pittel and Rűbbelke, 2011) . When terrorists behave rationally and predictably, it is possible for counterterrorist operations to meet terrorists' anticipated behavior (Abrahms, 2004) . Furthermore, counterterrorism can lead to terrorist groups splintering, as predicted by Dnes and Garoupa (2010) , and such splits in the IRA provide a natural experiment giving clues to the nature of terrorist organization and cell formation of wider interest. Coordination of loyalty within illegal groups is difficult as noted recently by Skarbek (2014) for the comparable problem affecting prison gangs, which, like terrorists, cannot enforce agreements by drawing on the institutions of mainstream society.
In this paper we examine the characteristics and associated behavior of individuals in a terrorist group, or 'cell,' which is a special case of a dysfunctional, or 'rogue,' social group. Comparable dysfunctional groups exist in street gangs, prison gangs, organized crime and rogue businesses (Gilbert, 2006; Venkatesh, 2008; Garoupa, Klick and Parisi, 2009; Dnes and Garoupa, 2010; Dnes, 2013; Skarbek 2014) . Individuals in a terrorist setting have negative value for the rest of society, impeding mainstream social and business activities, and exhibit considerable risk-taking for the narrow benefit of the group (Becker and Rubenstein, 2011) . Such a group must govern members (Skarbek, 2012 and 2014) to mitigate incentives for individuals to betray group interests. In the case of the IRA, betrayal has typically been associated with amnesties. Maintaining group solidarity has a public good element to it comparable to that affecting small polities Olson (1965) . We do examine betrayal issues, although our principal focus is on the peculiar human capital requirements underlying rogue groups.
Human capital requirements for terrorists are distinctive, whereas the public-good problem of coordinating group solidarity is common to all groups. The distinctive human capital in a group explains its distance from mainstream society and the scope, if any, for drawing it into the mainstream. This emphasis does not mean we are dismissive of the problem of coordinating the rogue group. Indeed, our analysis is consistent with the idea that high group solidarity, possibly based on ethnic factors, may well lead to greater longevity for the terrorist group (Blomberg, Gaibulloev, and Sandler, 2011) . We focus on several well documented case studies of evolved terrorism, drawing on four historical examples of factionalism, or 'splits' within the IRA. The history enables some testing, or at least an exploration, of the predictions of a model emphasizing the value of specialized human capital within rogue groups (Dnes and Garoupa, 2010) . The IRA is chosen as a basis for the empirical study because of the well documented nature of its organizational changes. Dnes and Garoupa (2010) used the example of a street gang to show that behavior in rogue groups can reflect rational influences more so than is commonly understood. Even apparently irrational behavior, such as publicly facing down much stronger gangs, may be indirectly rational in preserving reputational human capital. Much terrorist activity can 4 be shown to signal possession of skills of value to the rogue group, indicating a need to take a sophisticated view of deterrence principles in dealing with terrorism. Dnes and Garoupa (2010) draw on Allen and Reed's (2006) analysis of dueling as a screening device used to ascertain human capital in the shape of honor characteristics useful in a monarchic retinue, although for rogue groups the information flow appears to involve signaling (at the terrorist's effort cost) rather than screening by a principal. The terrorist cell is a particularly striking example of misplaced team spirit underlining the observation that not all cooperative behavior is welfare enhancing from a social perspective. Papers by Frey and Luechinger (2003) , Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2007) , and Phillips and Pohl (2014) also may be seen as raising questions about the applicability of standard deterrence analysis (Becker, 1968; Landes, 1976) in the case of terrorists, but drawing on observations about consequences of partial intrinsic motivation. Dnes and Garoupa (2010) emphasize the separation of dysfunctional groups from mainstream society and the influence of individuals' betrayal of the group on the impact of amnesty (leniency) policies, giving a good basis for the examination of factional splits. The betrayal possibility has a public good element for the group, but the more interesting aspect is how those terrorists with human capital closer to the endowments in mainstream society are more easily picked off by an amnesty, which leaves truly bad elements in place.
Further papers are also supportive of the view that the human capital in dysfunctional groups is highly distinctive. Limits to group formation arise through a comparison between outside and within-group opportunities, but this interaction is not straightforward. In particular, increasing outside opportunities for members may tempt disloyalty, the prospect of which can make the leader much more selective in admitting members and is likely to cause an increase in the perceived hardcore nastiness of terror groups. Reckless violence is a key characteristic observed for street gangs, as supported by empirical work on recklessness among violent individuals (Foreman-Peck and Moore, 2010) . Reading the history of Republican terrorism (below), similar characteristics appear to be important for terrorist groups, which emphasize idiosyncratic skills very dangerous to the rest of society. The prediction of an amnesty leading to a residual of hardcore members is supported by observations on the history of the IRA, which has been markedly affected by 'splits' into more fragmented terrorist organizations as anti-5 terrorist policies and outside opportunities have varied. The lessons drawn in this paper from well documented UK and Irish history may also help in understanding other terrorist developments such as the transition from al-Qaeda to ISIL in Syria and Iraq.
Splits within terrorist groups and associated increases in the severity of subsequent terrorism are widely observed and are a key prediction of the human-capital theory of gangs (Dnes and Garoupa, 2010) . Economic analysis suggests it may be an unrealistic expectation that policy can ever completely control terrorist activity, which is consistent with the historical evidence.
Behavior in Terrorist Cells
In this section we consider some key points drawn from the theoretical literature but do not repeat theoretical analysis in detail.
As noted by Frey and Luechinger (2007) , terrorism is often undertaken to achieve an indirect goal, which is usually political and can be at least partly associated with intrinsic motivation for the terrorist. It can be successful as a strategy, as can be observed Throughout history, terrorism has in fact often paid off for its participants.
Therefore, in just the way that street gangs pursue a mixture of collective and individual benefits (Dnes and Garoupa (2010: 523) , so terrorist groups can be viewed as engaged in a team effort to achieve gains some of which at least could be shared between members of the group, not necessarily equally. But note that an implication of responsiveness to achievable gains is the possibility of an individual terrorist betraying the group. Indeed, betrayal can be observed in the diffusing since 9/11 of plots to place explosives on airplanes, with information frequently coming from defecting terrorists via international intelligence services. Another, related, implication of incentive 6 responsiveness is that group members who possess human capital closer to that useful in mainstream society may try to rejoin mainstream society as relative costs and benefits change for the two types of membership. It is the comparison between outside opportunities and benefits from committing human capital to furthering the aims of the group that drives the possibility of a terrorist group's splitting. The leadership of the group may be expected to do everything possible to prevent a split, carrying out reprisals against informers and beneficiaries of amnesties, in much the manner described by Skarbek (2014) Another puzzle to be resolved is why terrorist groups split. A number of economicsbased explanations have been provided for factionalism within terrorist organizations.
These papers tend to suggest that counterterrorist response is an important determinant of the balance between moderate and more extreme elements within a given terrorist group.
In papers by de Figueirdo and Weingast (2001) and Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) terrorists can be either moderate or radical. In these papers moderates always become radicalized by government crackdowns. However, while these authors can explain why a given grouping can become more extreme, such an approach cannot easily explain why terrorist groups often split into factions. Historically, moderates have not always gone along with the extremist turn in a cell. Dnes and Garoupa (2010) (English, 2003; de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007) . Nonetheless, some of the observed increased extremism may reflect intensification of efforts to retain publicgood aspects of discipline within the remaining group. Dnes and Garoupa (2010: 524) Our purpose in this paper is to analyze the history of the IRA in relation to insights from the model, but for a moment we need to consider groups more generally. Dnes and Garoupa (2010) contemplate a population with varying ex-ante endowments of a particular type of human capital, which can be augmented by costly investment in the case of individuals sufficiently close to a reservation level set by a leader and allowing entry into the group. The selection of the leader is of no particular importance and we can just say that the leader emerges either by some kind of tournament, or as the possessor of the highest level of the relevant human capital, which in his case may include the ability to provide discipline of the group, which has public good elements for the individuals in the group (Olson, 1965; Skarbek, 2014) . Individuals then decide whether to try to join the group or stay in mainstream society (a kind of greater gang really) and are allowed to invest in the required skills to join the group. Investment for terrorists might include such historical examples as training for weeks in a Libyan camp, actually in much the same way that joining the commandos in the military requires investments in boot camp. This way of thinking implies that a significant ex-post skills gap will emerge between those within and outside the group, much as a skills gap emerges in Allen and Reed's (2006) treatment of dueling and associated codes of honor.
Key Predictions from a Model of Group Human Capital
The reason is that if some individuals are close in terms of human capital (skills) to the cut-off point set by a group leader they might well find it worth investing in enhancing their skills to move into the group. Thus, in much the same way that trained economists separate themselves from the rest of the population, a terrorist cell can be expected to contain people who are distinct from the surrounding population. Ex post, no-one would be in the skill range s R -s* for the general population, where s* is the minimum ex ante level at which it pays to invest to be brought up to s R the level required for group entry.
Dnes and Garoupa (2010) assume the leader benefits from a residual claim after rewarding group members unevenly according to their contribution to the output of the group, which may also be seen as embodying a reward for providing the public good of establishing group solidarity (Olson, 1965; Skarbek, 2014) . Note that holding discipline in the face of individual temptation to defect has public-good aspects for the group (Tullock, 1974) and is not simply a matter of deterring shirking in team production (compare Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) . In the case of a terrorist cell, total gains include those from eventual success in attaining political benefits, associated organized criminal activity, and other interactions with the outside world. Each member takes a share of the average gain that leaves a surplus available for payment to the leader. But for any individual, the expected gain from membership comprises the gain as a member plus the expected gain from betrayal. The probability of the individual betraying the group depends among other factors on the utility from betrayal, and will reflect such things as the introduction of a leniency program, amnesties, and increases in outside opportunities associated with leaving the group. Thus, groups are prone to desertion as incentives outside the group change and leaders have to deal with that threat. One way to think of this is to realize that the leader would otherwise want the group to grow without limit since extra foot soldiers will bring in more returns from which the leader will extract a residual. Some downside, such as increased organizational costs, or as here disloyalty costs, is needed to give an upper bound to the size of the group. Growth of the organizational unit inevitably makes the cost of providing public goods like group solidarity higher (Olson, 1965) because it becomes harder to monitor and influence foot soldiers.
Group leaders will suffer from problems of information asymmetry as they have no ability to discern levels of group-relevant human capital, ex ante. They can ascertain whether individuals have sufficient natural-born, or acquired group-relevant human capital by screening for or observing the signaling of terrorist acts. The danger of betrayal is also a motivating factor for expecting regular signaling of the commitment of cell members, which may well explain the frequency of minor as well as extreme acts of terrorism observed across the history of terrorist organizations. In the case of the IRA,
we can see regular, relatively small acts of terror, such as individual 'punishment beatings', as well as major acts such as the bombing of densely populated locations resulting in many deaths and injuries. One purpose of the smaller acts may well be to permit signaling of commitment by foot soldiers, as well as directly deterring the disloyalty to which the beating was a response. A useful comparator is the observation by students of street gangs of acts of extreme recklessness the purpose of which appears to be to impress other gang members (Gilbert, 2006) , and on the deterrence side Skarbek's (2014) observations of discipline within prison gangs. It is notable that the IRA organized its own internal security, colloquially known as the nutting squad. The role of this group was to interrogate, court-martial and execute suspected informants or spies. This group also organized the punishment squads, a lower tier of initially less skilled volunteers, who
were not members of the Active Service Units (ASUs) although crucially they could secure promotion to ASU membership if they displayed the appropriate abilities (O'Leary, 2007, p.204 ).
An increase in the probability of betrayal may reflect the growth of outside opportunities for members, and can reflect leniency programs. The increase has three important effects:
1. s*, the minimum ex ante level of group-relevant human capital at which it pays to invest to be brought up to s R , the level required for group entry decreases as more individuals are willing to invest in group human capital because outside opportunities after membership have increased; 11 2. The residual payment to the leader decreases as the leader is worse-off since the probability of betrayal has increased; 3. The leader will increase s R making group human capital requirements to offset the higher likelihood of betrayal.
The first and third effects taken together generate the ambiguous result that a change in the probability of betrayal might increase or decrease the size of the terrorist cell. The result nonetheless warn us that we can inadvertently make a period of time spent as a terrorist more attractive, i.e. less temporarily worrying to would-be members, by increasing the value of outside activities that can be pursued after retirement from active terrorism. This possibility might cause members to betray with increased frequency. However, increasing the level of group human capital, s R , has one completely unambiguous result: the cell will be smaller, but nastier from the point of view of the population at large.
Several important conclusions follow. First, there should be marked differences between the characteristics of the population at large and terrorist cells: it may be possible to profile terrorists by previous history, including membership of related organizations such as the political wings of broader terrorist movements. Secondly, we should find regular signaling of commitment within terrorist organizations, consistent with the investment and signaling mechanisms just described. Thirdly, terrorist amnesties and leniency programs could have the counterproductive effect of encouraging the formation of terrorist cells, but may not, since another possibility is reforming terrorists. Finally, when amnesties or increases in the costs of being a terrorist do reduce formation of cells, a hard-core residual is likely to remain. Nothing in this analysis precludes tough deterrence using conventional criminal-justice mechanisms from controlling terrorism, but an implication is that we may make it difficult for terrorists to give up and rejoin mainstream society. We now turn to an historical examination of the development of the IRA, which provides an institutional assessment of this reasoning based on group-relevant human capital. (Schelling, 1991: 23) .
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been a proscribed terrorist organization in both the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland for almost 100 years. The history of the IRA provides tests of theoretical predictions derived above. In particular, we can observe profile differences between IRA officers and men and the population at large, and the impact of varying outside incentives on the nature and strength of the IRA. Varying outside incentives tend to show up more as splits within the organization, or as amnesties for incarcerated terrorist prisoners, but a close connection exists between an organization's splitting and some of its members betraying others, and releasing prisoners can affect the incentives of possible recruits. Profile differences turn out to be more complex than predicted by the model, but consistent with its underlying focus. We also can observe a frequency of terrorist activity consistent with the relentless signaling of terror capacity.
An overview of the main details of the relevant history can be stated briefly, focusing on the long-tradition of splits within Irish republican terrorist groups. In the an organizational split, the previously dissident faction tends to be the more violent. As we will see also splits often beget further splits. Later dissident groups, the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA, are merely a recent manifestation of this tendency for these groups to split for tactical reasons such as disagreement over the means to be used to achieve Irish unity. Splits in themselves represent betrayal within an organization, reflecting more attractive outside opportunities, and may well alter the chances of betrayal in relation to the security authorities. The embrace of Marxist ideology by the IRA leadership and disillusionment with the republican rhetoric of the Irish leader, de Valera, at a time when the Irish Free State had emerged (via Dominion status like present-day Canada), ensured that many IRA members gave up involvement in politics (Smith, 1997 : 62: English, 2003 . Many socialist intellectuals left to fight in the Spanish civil war, while others defected to form the 'short-lived, fissiparous Republican Congress' (English, 2003: 49) .
The net result was that a hardcore residual group remained. This hardcore residual was crucially far more committed to violence than those who had left the organization.
Sean Russell, a member of this militant faction, was elected IRA Chief of Staff at the IRA Convention of 1938. Russell advocated an IRA bombing campaign against England.
It is noteworthy that Russell's election as leader led to the further defection of several relatively less militaristic figures such as Seán MacBride and Tom Barry (Smith, 1997: 62-63).
By the end of 1939 there had been 291 bombs exploded in Britain. These attacks resulted in 96 injuries and seven deaths. A tough security response followed: in Eire (Ireland), a Special Branch raid in September 1939 led to the arrest of virtually the entire IRA General Headquarters (GHQ) (Bell, 1990: 168) . In Northern Ireland, IRA members were interned for the duration of the War, and the tight security response broke the organization apart. The bulk of the membership was jailed in the UK and Eire, or had been shot down, and, as late as 1950, twelve IRA members were still imprisoned in Belfast's Crumlin Road prison. By 1945 the IRA had "apparently died, defeated, another romantic cord in the pattern of Irish history frayed and broken" (Bell, 1990: 235) .
Neither the British at war, nor the ostensibly neutral Irish, wanted to risk misunderstandings over nationalist conflict during WWII: both therefore cracked down hard. Moreover, as the following section shows, the IRA was revived briefly within a decade, but it would face similar internal tensions as it did in the 1930s and 1940s.
Ruthless responses to terrorism in the late 1930s and early 1940s seemingly broke the IRA for a time, perhaps under special circumstances, and not dependent on amnesties or similar leniency programs. The period supports an interpretation a narrowly drawn application of deterrence principles, with a measure of incapacitation of combatants thrown in for good measure. Nonetheless, before the run up to WWII, it is clear that a post-independence division emerged between moderate and more extreme republicans, with the later remaining as a militaristic hardcore in a much reduced IRA.
The IRA border campaign 1956-1962
The planning for this campaign began in 1950, but the initial attacks started later in 1956.
However, the IRA's prospects for success in the border war 'melted away' by 1957 as the (by then) Irish Republic's government introduced internment. By the end of 1958, nearly all the Army Council, GHQ staff and Sinn Féin executive had been jailed (Smith, 1997: 71) . Inevitably this diminished the IRA's capacity for waging attacks, though there were over five hundred incidents 1956-62 (English, 2003, p.76) . The IRA had to call off its campaign by February 1962 (English, 2003, p.75) . A lack of widespread public support, poor organization, successful co-operation between the Gardai (the Republic's police force) and the RUC in Northern Ireland, and the effective use of internment in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic all explain the failure of the IRA border campaign (English, 2003: 76) . Again, ruthless counterterrorism based on intelligence and military suppression proved to be decisive in containing terrorism.
The failure of the border campaign provoked an internal review led by Cathal Goulding, the IRA Chief of Staff from 1962. The response within the IRA was tension between those advocating a socialist-republican analysis and those favoring a more militant traditionalist approach. Initially, and again as in the 1930s, a leftist group came to dominate the IRA; history repeated itself and tensions soon resurfaced between those who were more committed to paramilitarism and those more committed to revolutionary politics. When Goulding came to power, he inherited an IRA that lacked arms, money or volunteers (English, 2003: 83) , which, even by the spring of 1969, was still weak as well as increasingly divided; British Intelligence estimated that it had just 500 members.
Although morale was good, arms and ammunition were in short supply and financially terms is a kind of credible commitment device, aimed precisely at preventing the continued operation of a hardcore residual that had already been seen at several points in history.
The leniency shown toward prisoners in the late 1950s and early 1960s operated to put terrorists back into circulation in the case of unconditional releases. In the case of conditional releases, recirculation could occur if terms of release were flouted, but, at any rate, release would signal 'life after terrorism' to newer recruits. The IRA was positioned to become stronger again as the 1960s progressed.
The Official and Provisional IRA split 1969-70
A well-known rift within Irish republicanism was sparked by the IRA leadership's 1969 decision to end abstention from election to parliaments in Belfast, Dublin and London.
This decision represented a softening of outlook and a break from republican orthodoxy.
It was a final straw for traditionalists like Seán MacStíofáin who formed a new body, the Provisional Army Council, following the Sinn Féin general meeting known as the Ard
Fheis held on 11 January 1970 (English, 2003: 106) . The resolution to end the policy of abstention was pushed through and about one-third of the delegates walked out and reassembled to announce the formation of Provisional Sinn Féin (PSF). They also announced that a Provisional Army Council had been established to recognize this new IRA faction (English, 2003: 107 ).
Alonso's analysis based on a series of interviews suggests that the IRA split in the late 1960s was the consequence of tactical more than ideological differences. The evidence he presents indicates that different assessments of the value of pursuing the bullet and ballot box were instrumental in leading to the split:
...the split at the end of the 1960s between the Officials and Provisionals was due to the latter's refusal to complement the campaign of violence with a greater involvement in politics. From the second half of the 1970s onwards, however, the Provisionals gradually came to accept the ideas which they had rejected when they broke away from the Officials (Alonso, 2007: 142) There were now two separate groups claiming to be the Irish Republican Army-one a more leftist grouping led by Goulding, referred to as the Official IRA (OIRA), and the other a more traditional and militant republican grouping led by MacStíofáin -the Provisional IRA (PIRA) (Smith, 1997: 83; Hanley and Miller, 2009: 146-147) .
Intelligence (Smith, 1997: 84-86) . This third (and most hard-line faction) was 'undoubtedly the smallest and least important faction at the time of the split, but being highly motivated politically they were to move swiftly through the Provisionals' ranks [occupying] positions of influence in the years ahead' (Smith, 1997: 86) . The conditions enabling the Provisionals to develop in this manner included the easing back on tough criminal justice measures, such as those seen in the 1940s, and leniency/amnesty measures in the 1950s and 1960s.
The motivation of individual Provisional IRA members has been well covered by both investigative journalists and academics (O'Doherty, 1998; O'Leary, 2007; English, 2016) . While a complete assessment is well beyond the scope of this paper, it is the case that the evidence presents a number of findings particularly relevant to economists. Following Frey's distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation we can see evidence of both. English noted that membership of the IRA was not without its extrinsic rewards. He highlighted that it could give members celebrity status within some 20 communities (English, 2016: 143) . English also noted that some members exploited this celebrity status to secure financial and sexual rewards for themselves. Furthermore, English saw excitement as a motivation for some members (English, 2016: 143) .
However, English notes that the dominant motivations were often intrinsic. English highlights the role of sectarian impulses as an intrinsic motivation and he argues that
Marxist ideology was a secondary motivation (English, 2016: 108-109 ).
The formation of PIRA was caused by disillusionment among hardliners that an excessive focus on Marxism and seeking electoral success would diminish what they saw as the IRA's primary function: its military role.
'The politics of the old IRA had led to the generation of a new one; the latter owed the conditions of its birth, as well as the experience of some its key personnel, to the former.' (English, 2003: 108) The Provisional's greater willingness to engage in tit-for-tat violence and the OIRA's initial reluctance accounts for the separate paths followed. When OIRA did attempt to stem the hemorrhaging of its support to PIRA and engaged in more high-profile acts of violence, such as the Aldershot bombing of 1972 and the murder in 1971 of the Unionist politician Senator Jack Barnhill, it was too late. The OIRA could never out-militarize PIRA in the competition for support. By May 1972, OIRA had announced a ceasefire, but this announcement was made after widespread internal dissent and the ceasefire was not immediately implemented. By the end of 1973 the OIRA ceased military operations (Smith, 1997: 90) .
In terms of the support for the Provisional IRA, evidence suggests that it was more complex than is often supposed. For example, location mattered, O'Doherty has noted that patterns of support even within West Belfast differed. Support for PIRA in the New Lodge was far more related to sectarian tensions than those on the solidly Catholic Falls (O'Doherty, 1998: 133). English additionally observes that those discussing IRA support should note that Sinn Féin became the electorally dominant party within Irish nationalism after the Provisionals started to bring violence to an end (English, 2016: 119) . Scholars have long pointed out that the Provisional IRA faced considerable opposition even from communities where it received support, and this had repercussions for the organization (Burton, 1978) . Even when observers have noted the role of punishment beatings and shootings in maintaining popular support they have noted that the situation was a complex one (Smith, 1997; O'Doherty, 1998) . Indeed O'Doherty's insight is that the high level of PIRA violence exerted within working class communities was not a measure of any overwhelming support, rather he suggests such violence allowed republicans to generate an impression of a coherent republican community in an area like West Belfast' (O'Doherty, 1998: 150) .
Critics of the symbolism of the ceasefire announcement argued that PIRA would extend their influence at the expense of the OIRA (Smith, 1997: 89) . apart in the 1980s as it too was beset by factionalism (Smith, 1997: 90) . The growth in factionalism may be seen as a process in which milder elements of the IRA were drawn back toward mainstream society by a combination of leniency programs and tough criminal-justice measures: PIRA and similar subsequent splits were then a hardcore response to this process.
Deterrence as well as leniency programs were both part of the UK response.
Furthermore, social and interventionist economic policies were developed in response to the recognition of a linkage between social deprivation and political violence (Bean, 2008) . In addition, the ability of the UK government in the early 1970s to respond to the Provisional IRA's 'economic war' by increasingly subsidizing Northern Irish industrial and commercial life arguably acted as a signal to Republicans that violence would not cause enough economic damage to attain their objectives (Brownlow, 2012) . Roy Mason, who served as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland between 1976 and 1979, strongly advocated the need to pursue both inward investment and tough security policies within a counterterrorism signaling strategy (Brownlow, 2012) .
Another vital component in Northern Irish counterterrorism was the role of intelligence. English (2016) observes that more generally the role of intelligence, and the use of informers and technical surveillance in particular, was crucial in undermining the capacity of PIRA to engage in violence (English, 2016: 125) . English suggests that by the 22 late 1980s and early 1990s the intelligence advantage of the state was such that the Provisional IRA was made receptive to a compromise deal (English, 2016: 126 (Smith, 1997: 188) .
It should equally be recalled that it was a failure of security intelligence that led [Insert Figure 1 here]
Contemporary dissidents
Just as the shift away from political abstention in the late 1960s forced the previous dissidents, the more hard line PIRA, to split away from the Official IRA, so similar disagreements explain the break away of the various currently active dissident groups.
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The the Adams leadership plan to abandon the traditional strategy of abstention (Moloney, 2002: 289) . As with some previous rivals to PIRA, such as OIRA or INLA they lacked 24 enough critical mass in membership to become a serious threat. The CIRA was so fragile initially and so fearful of reprisals from the Provisionals that it was some years before the CIRA even revealed its existence (Moloney, 2002: 289) .
The CIRA did not become active until after the Provisional IRA ceasefire of 1994. It has remained active in the period after the Good Friday Agreements and shows that even when the terrorist swamp is drained, a hardcore group is likely to remain (Dnes and Garoupa, 2010: 526) . This dissident group has been involved in a number of The Real IRA (and its political wing, the 32-County Sovereignty Committee) was
formed after yet another split within PIRA. This time the 1997 split was caused by a faction within the organization objecting to republicans signing up to the Mitchell principles of non-violence, a necessary pre-condition to Sinn Féin entering the all-party negotiations which led to the Good Friday Agreement and power sharing (English, 2003: 316) . The new dissident organization also confusingly took the title Óglaigh na hÉireann but was soon referred to by the media as 'the Real IRA' (Maloney 2002: 479) . Such was the momentousness of the 1997 decision that it was inevitable that a split would occur.
The fundamental questions concerned the timing, scale and damage that the split would cause. It is a reflection of discipline within PIRA that it took until 1997 for the split to emerge, after two Provisional IRA ceasefires had been called and maintained (Maloney 2002: 479) . The Mitchell principles enabled early prisoner release, after which this discipline gave way to yet another split.
Another modern faction, the Real IRA views itself as the continuation of the armed struggle and has adopted Provisional tactics of sustained bombings and shootings in both Northern Ireland and on the UK mainland. The Real IRA that was responsible for the Omagh bomb which killed 29 people and injured over 200 in 1998. The group called a cease-fire in 1999 but recommenced violence in 2000 (English, 2003: 318 Republican groups suggests that the police reform that has occurred in Northern Ireland, whilst having political benefits in terms of securing political agreement on policing, has had operational costs as well. This cost is of particular concern because the operational capacity of the contemporary dissidents is high, as the leadership of the modern dissidents, unlike the leadership of the Provisional IRA in the early 1970s, has accumulated organizational and technical knowledge from decades of terrorism (Frampton, 2010: 34) .
The lessons from the history of the IRA
This paper has examined Irish Republican paramilitarism by applying the insights from a model to the available historical material. The approach followed complements the valuable work of social scientists who have used interviews with former paramilitaries to establish the emergence, actions and eventual disappearance of the Provisional IRA as an effective paramilitary force (Alonso, 2007; English, 2016 ). An emerging literature about dissidents has recently emerged which follows similar approaches as well as discourse and data analyses (Edwards, 2011; Whiting, 2012;  acknowledged.
Several important lessons arise from examining the history of IRA activity. First, events reveal the periodic emergence of gaps in human-capital characteristics between IRA leaders, terrorist foot soldiers and the wider population. However, the gaps are more like a dotted line than the bipolar dichotomy envisaged by Dnes and Garoupa (2010) .
The gap is indeed consistent with the model of human capital formation in gangs, but is characterized by much more detail than an insider-outsider view would suggest. In reality, at least in the case of the IRA, we have seen associations between several groups of distinct terrorist types, albeit that this gradation ultimately preserves a distinct gap between normal society and the terrorists.
Amnesties and, more generally, leniency programs, have operated to alter the incentives for remaining inside IRA groups. Outside incentives operated through amnesties that were typically offered to incarcerated terrorists, but which had implications for lowering the cost of getting out of active terrorism for individual IRA members. In particular, the Good Friday agreement provided a mechanism allowing members of the Provisional IRA to rejoin mainstream politics and realize gains from terror campaigns.
Factions and terrorist actions continue to exist, after the conclusion of the peace process, illustrating the theoretical prediction in Dnes and Garoupa (2010) that nasty residuals remain after amnesty arrangements are put into place. It is indeed a rarity to find the terrorist swamp completely drained.
An implication is that authorities using amnesties to draw terrorists back into mainstream society should be realistic about what will happen: the terrorist problem will not completely disappear. A general observation is that where amnesties have been associated with enforced requirements for terrorists to disarm and to do so credibly, any residual faction has been weakened in resuming effective terrorism: a very clear practical illustration of the importance of devices supporting credible commitments (Williamson, 1983) . The case of Northern Ireland shows the learning of that lesson early on, and then its repeated application to the peace process.
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The pattern of factionalism is consistent with Dnes and Garoupa's (2010: 523) modeling of betrayal possibilities in gangs, but it shows up in practical terms as pressure building within a terrorist organization as outside opportunities lead different groups in different directions. A connection may be made between an organization's splitting and some of its members being in a position to betray others, or feeling betrayed by others who are seen as losing connection with the terrorist cause, so that a split typically amounts to the emergence of a hardcore residual faction. Betrayal also reflects a breakdown in the leadership's ability to provide solidarity, which has public-good characteristics within the group (compare Skarbek, 2014) . The long tradition of splits within Irish republican terrorist groups often reflected left-leaning leaderships falling out of step with the wider population, including IRA foot soldiers. This division created tensions and led to departures resulting in a hardcore residual that pursued bombing campaigns in Ireland and England, reflecting some of the intra-organizational commitment issues associated with other rogue groups such as pirates (Leeson, 2009 ).
After WWII, the IRA border campaign of 1956-62 was a total failure and subsequent amnesties for political prisoners north and south of the Irish border may have facilitated later violence. Conversely, deterrence policies (notably internment, which incapacitates terrorists) were successful in most periods in combating the IRA. Really hard crack downs, on both sides of the Irish border, as happened between the late 1930s and early 1940s, appear to have controlled IRA violence for significant periods of time as a kind of "corner solution" in the extreme conditions surrounding WWII. Dnes and Garoupa (2010) emphasized the sophisticated manner in which incentives operated within gangs:
but really harsh, crude imprisonment measures, almost alone, did in fact control the IRA in the 1940s. A key ingredient in containment was cross-border cooperation ensuring that the terrorists had nowhere to go, at least for a period of time.
Conclusions and policy implications
It is important to recognize the many influences on how individuals end up in terrorist organizations, which have distinct human-capital characteristics compared with mainstream society. Nonetheless, it is possible to show that terrorist groups form, and fragment, under incentives derived from the costs and benefits of joining the organization, including the leader's problem of maintaining group solidarity. Tough criminal justice policy measures and leniency programs have both played roles in containing IRA terrorism since the 1930s. The peace accords following the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 most certainly allowed a way out from terrorism for IRA members, and particularly members of the Provisional IRA, effectively realizing gains from terrorism for many individuals. The history shows that leniency has placed terrorists back into circulation and revitalized IRA factions, and that this may have been the real effect to worry about in relation to amnesties: the possibility that reassuring new recruits of an eventual way back to mainstream society increased terrorist recruitment was worrying, but was dominated by the sheer impact of releasing active terrorists. In the case of IRA violence, imprisoning militants did knock out the organization for lengthy periods of time.
We also examined the prediction that increasing the benefits of moving into mainstream society will tend to reduce membership of a terrorist group, but can also induce changes in recruitment leading to remaining gang members being particularly nasty examples of the genus. The increase in severity predicted to follow from increasing outside benefits implies a need for tough action later on, if the group is really to be suppressed. Such a hardcore residual membership does seem to be associated with prisoner amnesties and organizational splits in the case of the IRA, and still bedevils the aftermath of the peace process in Northern Ireland. The analysis developed in this paper hence confirms the analysis of political historians and strategic studies scholars that while particular terrorist campaigns end, terrorism does not (English, 2009; Edwards, 2011) . Belfast.
